Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 22

Number 3

Article 2

7-1-2015

The Role of Performance Management in Good Governance and
Its Application in Public Education
Carolyn J. Heinrich
University of Texas at Austin

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research
Part of the Education Economics Commons

Citation
Heinrich, Carolyn, J. 2015. "The Role of Performance Management in Good Governance and Its
Application in Public Education." Employment Research 22(3): 4-6. https://doi.org/10.17848/
1075-8445.22(3)-2

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

Employment Research

JULY 2015

Carolyn J. Heinrich

The Role of Performance
Management in Good
Governance and Its
Application in Public
Education
This article draws from the author’s
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Governance (Asefa and Huang, eds.), which
was recently published by the Upjohn
Institute. To order the book, visit www.upjohn
.org/up_press, or see p. 7 for more details.

G

overnance—laws, rules, judicial
decisions, and administrative practices
that prescribe and enable the provision of
publicly supported goods and services—
determines government performance
(Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001). The role
of performance management, in turn,
is to shape how public sector agencies,
programs, and activities are organized
and managed to achieve public purposes
and desired outcomes.
The origins of performance
management lie in a basic agencytheory framework, where an owner hires
managers and workers to generate profits
(with the owner or manager acting as
principal, and the workers as agents).
The principal’s main objective is to
design a contract that aligns principal
and agent incentives and achieves the
principal’s production objectives. This is
made challenging, however, by the fact
that these relationships are frequently
typified by conflicts in goals and values,
as well as privately held information or
information asymmetries.
It is here that a role for performance
management enters in, in monitoring
worker actions, outputs, and outcomes,
and in developing an incentive scheme
that aligns principal and agent interests—
essentially, a contractual relationship
with performance expectations and
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credible provisions for enforcing it.
However, even in a simple production
system—where organizational goals
and production tasks are known, a linear
relationship exists between efforts and
outputs, and there are relatively few
variables for managers to control—an
enforceable contract is difficult to
achieve.
One well-known problem is
adverse selection, where employees’
true motivations or capabilities for
producing a desired outcome are
unknown. The second is moral hazard
and unobservability, in which employees’

Effective performance
management demands clarity
of goals and their translation
into empirical measures that
adequately characterize
our intended outcomes.
efforts or actions are not observable or
readily measured, creating conditions that
encourage shirking or distorted results.
Recent headlines reporting cheating
scandals in K–12 schools—under
pressure to meet performance targets on
standardized tests set by the No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) Act—are just one
example of how these problems can
undermine performance management
efforts (Rich 2013).
Yet many contracts and performance
management systems still incorporate
basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive
schemes, largely because of their
perceived simplicity and the significant

costs of establishing a more intricate
contract or system of incentives. A
straight-line approach typically defines
a required (linear) rate of performance
improvement from an initial score or
target and may also specify an ending
value corresponding to a maximum
performance level, such as NCLB’s goal
of 100 percent proficiency in reading and
mathematics for public school students
(see Figure 1). NCLB also provides an
example of an important shortcoming
of straight-line models for establishing
performance expectations: they are
seldom constructed using empirical data
that would generate realistic expectations
for performance (Koretz and Hamilton
2006). In fact, Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan acknowledged that the
performance management system under
NCLB evolved “from an instrument of
reform into a barrier to reform” (U.S.
Department of Education 2013, p. 1).
From the start, the application
of agency theory to the design of
performance management systems in
the public sector has been complex.
First, just who is the principal in a given
governance setting? Governance in
the public sector is multilayered and
dynamic. In addition, consensus or
clarity on goals is often lacking among
citizens, and sometimes in originating
legislation as well. The public sector
is also distinctive in that its primary
work typically involves complex,
nonmanual work, characterized by
multilevel interactions and public-private
sector partnerships. Nonstandardized
outputs make the accurate measurement
of performance and construction
of performance benchmarks more
challenging and more costly. Finally,
the public sector is also distinct from
the private sector in the extent to which
political influences may be brought to
bear at many different levels. Goals
and priorities can change swiftly, and
entire agencies or authority structures
can be reorganized, as well as the foci of
primary work. There is great potential for
unintended consequences as performance
management and the use of performancebased contracts expand into uncharted
public-sector territory (Koning and
Heinrich 2013).
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Figure 2.1 Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for Increased
Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested in Math, 2002–
2014 (% that must be met of students testing at the “proficient” level)
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NOTE: The figure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve a rating of “proficient” in testing for math under the legislation. The bar for 2002, the first year the
law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as proficient in math that
year, and no improvement was required for the first year following that. But thereafter, increasing
percentages of proficiency were set for each year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kindergarteners through eighth graders were expected to be proficient in math. (The exception was
2006, when the expectations were not raised from 2005.)
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

Applying Performance Management
Bluntly in Public Education
We spend close to $600 billion
annually on our public elementary and
secondary school system, and the public
is demanding greater accountability and
results. Furthermore, public education
today is characterized by elaborate
governing structures with deeply layered
and overlapping levels of decision
making, widely varying views on
appropriate means and ends for improving
education, an increasingly complex
technology with diverse outputs (which
we subject to standardized measures of
outcomes), and political influences that
interject at many levels. Could the use
of performance management potentially
bring some clarity and coherence to K–12
education governance?
We have proceeded full speed
ahead with regimes for performance
management and accountability in
education that include strong incentives
and high-stakes consequences for

many stakeholders. NCLB marked the
beginning of an assertive federal role
in directing state and local practices to
meet student performance standards.
The federal government holds states,
districts, and schools accountable for a
comprehensive set of standards, including
annual academic progress, teacher
quality, and achievement gaps, and
for developing assessments of student
performance relative to those standards.
NCLB defines educational success
primarily based on standardized tests
of students’ performance, and current
funding and accountability systems
presume “same-age cohorts of students
proceeding in lockstep” (Wilson 2013,
p. 96). Consistent with the origins of
performance management, DarlingHammond (2002, p. 6) describes how
our test-based accountability system
reflects a “factory-model approach” to
education, in which schools are organized
“to process large batches of students
in assembly-line fashion rather than to
ensure that students are well-known

by their teachers and treated as serious
learners.”
Recently, recognition of the limitations
of proficiency measures under NCLB
has propelled alternative approaches to
measuring educational performance,
particularly value-added measures. A
basic value-added model compares the
individual growth of a group of students
(e.g., in a given classroom or school)
to average growth of the population of
interest (e.g., growth among all students
in the state). Some value-added models
are also constructed to account for
factors outside the control of schools in
estimating growth in student achievement
over time. Although these are (arguably)
better measures of performance than
proficiency levels, should society be
ratcheting up the stakes that it attaches to
them, as we have recently seen in some
large, urban school districts?
One of the most controversial
recent developments in performance
management in education has been
the high-profile, public dissemination
of value-added measures of teacher
performance in large school districts,
including in Los Angeles and New York.
Calculated by third parties (outside
the district), the value-added measures
associated with specific teachers were
published in the Los Angeles Times and
by the New York City Department of
Education.1 The objective was to get
the performance information directly to
citizen stakeholders, who could use this
information and their political power
to drive public-sector performance
improvements.
However, in New York City, the
margin of error in value-added measures
was so wide that the average confidence
interval around each rating spanned 35
percentiles in math and 53 percentiles
in English, the city said. Some teachers
were judged on as few as 10 students.
In publishing the Los Angeles numbers,
the L.A. Times acknowledged that
value-added measures “do not capture
everything about a teacher or school’s
performance” (see Note 1). A study by
Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet
and Chiang 2010) finds that the error rate
for value-added scores (based on three
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore,
a three-year model would rate one out
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of every four teachers incorrectly, and
with only one year of data, the error rate
jumped to 35 percent.
Lessons for Improving the Effectiveness
of Performance Management
What have we learned about the
role of performance management in
contributing to good governance and
improving government outcomes?
 The effective use of performance
management demands clarity of goals
and their translation into empirical
measures that accurately and adequately
characterize our intended outcomes.
Where we fail on either of these
components, the performance
management system may risk doing more
harm than good. In many cases, the data
available simply are not up to the task.
In light of these limitations,
and recognizing that performance
management often grapples with multiple
goals and complex production, we may
be better off with multidimensional
measures of performance to guide our
work. A number of school districts and
states are now developing these types
of multipurpose, multiple-indicator
performance management systems
for K–12 education (New York City
Department of Education 2014). A
potential trade-off, of course, is that a
more intricate or complicated system
and set of incentives would likely place
a greater demand on public capacities for
managing such a system.
 Caution should be exercised in
attaching high stakes to performance
results, given the known challenges
and imperfections of our performance
measures.
The awarding of performance
bonuses, “naming and shaming” (as
in the publication of teacher valueadded), termination of contracts, or
retractions of program funding would
best be backed or verified by multiple
sources of quantitative and qualitative
evidence before going forward. A
counterargument frequently offered
against eliminating high stakes altogether
is that the performance management
and incentive systems will lose their
“teeth” and purpose. Evidence to date,
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however, suggests that individuals and
organizations are highly responsive
to performance standards, even when
the rewards are minimal, such as peer
recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006;
Heinrich 2007).

Koning, Pierre, and Carolyn J. Heinrich.
2013. “Cream-Skimming, Parking, and Other
Intended and Unintended Effects of HighPowered, Performance-Based Contracts.”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
32(3): 461–483.

 Performance management systems
are likely to be more effective tools of
governance if we focus more on their use
for diagnostic purposes.
That is, resources and rewards should
follow their effective use in improving
government and program outcomes,
rather than for hitting performance
targets. In the public education example,
schools or teachers would be rewarded
for using information on students’
performance to help increase their
learning, ideally measured in terms
of their individual growth that is not
based solely on test score levels or
gains. This would be a more appropriate
outcome to report publicly (for the
sake of transparency), and, if measured
sufficiently, would also reward the right
types of efforts to increase performance,
that is, not success in increasing testtaking skills but rather effective use of
performance information to help students
succeed academically.

Koretz, Daniel M., and Laura S. Hamilton.
2006. “Testing for Accountability in K–12.”
In Educational Measurement, Robert L.
Brennan, ed. 4th ed. American Council
on Education–Praeger Series on Higher
Education. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 531–
578.

Note
1. See http://projects.latimes.com/value
-added/ and http://www.schoolbook.org/
2012/02/24/teacher-data-reports-are
-released (accessed June 10, 2015).
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